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“Great Laws, Bad Implementation” — Criminal Justice
Reform in Russia since the Fall of the Soviet Union
Taryn Strohmeyer
INTRODUCTION
“We have a completely new code – the best in the world, but with the worst
implementation.” This is the way eminent criminal defense attorney Murad Musaev
of the law firm Musaev & Partners in Moscow described the situation in Russia
since the implementation of post-Soviet reforms to the criminal justice system. This
was not the first or the last time I would hear about this notion of the Russian
criminal justice during my trip to Russia with The University of Chicago Law
School International Immersion Program, during which a group of eleven
University of Chicago Law students and myself travelled to Moscow and St.
Petersburg, learning over the course of ten days about the legal regime, political
landscape, history, and culture of Russia through coordinated meetings, talks,
lunches, dinners, and events with lawyers, UChicago alums, professors, and
advocates.
Over and over again, my classmates and I heard the same notion regarding
Russia’s post-Soviet transition, which began in the early 90s with a new
constitution and led to the adoption of a new criminal code. The students, lawyers,
and scholars we met in both Moscow and St. Petersburg all seemed to echo the same
belief that Russia has “great laws” but simply suffers from “bad implementation.”
This paper will investigate this claim, analyzing what is meant by the idea that
Russia has “great laws, bad implementation,” laying out some of the issues with the

Russian criminal justice transition and considering a few of the factors that might
cause this impression or phenomenon.
In the first section, this paper will provide general background on Russia’s
transition from communism to democracy, including the adoption of a new
constitution and implementation of a new criminal code. The second section of this
paper will describe the problems and failings of the Russian criminal justice system
that lead scholars and lawyers to decry the code’s “bad implementation.” Then
finally, the third section outlines some of the potential contributing factors and
causes of the problems described in section two.
I. GENERAL BACKGROUND OF POST-SOVIET TRANSITION IN RUSSIA
The problems of criminal justice reform in Russia today are a product of the
overall transition from communism to democracy in Russia after the fall of the
Soviet era. This section will briefly outline the events that led to the fall of the
Soviet Union, the transition to a democratic regime, and the efforts to reform the
criminal justice system in the new Russia. This section will also provide brief
insight into the criminal justice system before and after the fall, and some of the
difficulties faced in implementing criminal justice reform – both of which will be
touched on in greater detail at other points in this paper.
a. Historical Foundations
Mikhail Gorbachev was the last leader of the Russian Communist regime.
His reign, which was marked by a series of democratizing reforms, ultimately

resulted in severe economic crisis and an accompanying widespread dissatisfaction
that ushered in the ultimate collapse of the Soviet era.
The Gorbachev years severely weakened the communist regime. During his
time in power Gorbachev implemented the concepts of “glasnost” (openness) and
“perestroika” (reconstruction of the Communist regime). 1 These essentially
capitalistic and democratic reforms included implementing elections with a multiparty system, establishing a presidency for the Soviet Union, and loosening overall
the central controls of the Soviet Union over the countries of Eastern Europe. 2
Gorbachev believed that his reforms would revitalize the Communist regime and
lead it to triumph in Europe; however, they instead caused great instability and an
extreme economic crisis that turned the population against him. 3 Furthermore,
these reforms began a “slow process of democratization” that led to the fall of the
Berlin wall, worked to destabilized Communist control, and ultimately set the stage
for the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union. 4
On December 25, 1991, Gorbachev resigned his post and the Soviet Union
finally fell, leaving Boris Yeltsin as the president of the new Russia. 5 Upon the
collapse of the Soviet Union, the former monolith broke apart into twelve
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independent republics: Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia,
Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan. 6
Yeltsin was ultimately able to reorganize several of the republics into what is today
the Russian Federation, a single state composed of the remaining republics left
after the fall of the Soviet Union; but, this marked the beginning of a rapid period of
transition for the new Russia that was both economic and political. 7
b. Transition to Democracy
The 1970s had marked the beginning of a long downward trend in economic
power for the Soviet regime, which reached crescendo in the final years of the
USSR. 8 In 1989 and 1990 the USSR suffered from severe declines in outputs,
extreme shortages, horrendous living conditions, and overall fear of an impending
collapse. 9 After the collapse, Yeltsin began an extensive program of radical
democratizing reforms. 10 “The program laid out a number of macroeconomic policy
measures to achieve stabilization. It called for sharp reductions in government
spending, targeting outlays for public investment projects, defense, and producer
and consumer subsidies. The program aimed at reducing the government budget
deficit, imposing new taxes and controlling inflation. Crucially, the reformers
planned to liberalize trade and make the ruble convertible, thus opening up
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Russia’s economy to the world.” 11 Furthermore, almost overnight the communist
regime of the Soviet Union transformed into a multiparty democracy with regular
elections and a capitalist economy based on markets, free enterprise and private
property. 12
With the fall of the Soviet Union, the new Russia also had to undertake the
tremendous task of establishing a new legal regime. This involved adopting a new
constitution and implementing a new criminal code. On December 12, 1993, the new
Russia adopted by referendum its new constitution. 13 While the new constitution
still gave considerable power to the president and included restrictions on the
sovereignty of regions within the Russian Federation, it guaranteed “a spectrum of
rights: freedom of conscience, freedom of movement, freedom of the press, the right
to private property and the right to own land, which the previous document
restricted.” 14
Then in 1997, attempts to overhaul the criminal code were finally successful
when the new code was passed in the Duma. 15 However, the changes were not
officially made into law until current Russian president Vladimir Putin pushed the
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code through in 2001. 16 The new criminal code includes over 3,500 amendments, but
is still based on the old Soviet code, which limits the rights of the accused and
provides no right to a jury trial. 17 “An estimated 150,000 criminal cases were
expected to require review based on the new code” to determine if the prisoners in
such cases should be released because the laws under which they were convicted no
longer exist. 18 For both the new constitution and criminal code, the new Russia
looked to Western Europe and the United States as models. 19
c. Criminal Justice Reform
Under the Soviet era, the criminal code served to protect the interests of the
state and keep the masses under control. 20 Judges served five year terms, were
subordinated to the Communist Party, and generally carried out the wishes of the
government lest they face removal. 21 The laws, which were notoriously ambiguous,
were easily mutable depending on the whims and desires of the authorities
enforcing them. 22 Those charged with crimes had little protection– there were no
jury trials, defense attorneys were not taken seriously by the court, and judges also
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served as prosecutors on their cases. 23 Accordingly, those charged with crimes were
almost always convicted, and had little hope of overturning their sentence. 24
The new code, which was implemented in 2001, is a combination of European
continental civil law and Soviet law. 25 While Soviet law retained a prominent role in
the new system, reform efforts sought to model the new code after Western Europe
and the United States. 26 This involved three primary reforms. First, the new
criminal justice system aimed to increase the independence of the judiciary. 27
Second, the new regime sought to limit the influence of the Russian Procurary, the
administrative agency responsible for criminal investigations (hereinafter “the
Prosecution”). 28 Finally, amendments to the new criminal code were designed to
change the Russian criminal justice system from an inquisitorial system to an
adversarial system. 29
Together these reforms attempted to address the inadequacies and failings of
the Soviet era criminal justice system. The reforms were expansive and pervasive,
however, upon implementation, as the Sections II and III will explain in greater
detail, many reform efforts fell short. These failures are presumably what led to the
“great laws, bad implementation” phenomenon, which Russian legal scholars of all
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types seem to agree characterizes the criminal justice system in Russia since the
collapse of the Soviet Union.
II. BAD IMPLEMENTATION
This section investigates what “bad implementation” really looks like in
modern Russia and outlines some of the primary ways in which Russia’s so-called
“great laws” fail to be implemented. While the Moscow criminal defense attorney,
who uttered our here-paradigmatic phrase “great laws, bad implementation,”
seemed to downplay the severity of the problems with the modern Russian criminal
justice regime– dispassionately commenting: “our implementation is just bad”–
research reveals a system plagued by many of the same problems and injustices
faced during the Soviet regime. 30 It would seem that despite “great laws,” “Russia
is still a country where suspects can be detained indefinitely, where arbitrary,
politically and even economically motivated prosecutions are common, where
coercion of suspects is rampant, where the police can stop anyone on the street
without any reasonable cause.” 31
a. General
“Constitutional change becomes meaningless … unless it is accomplished by
constitutionalist procedure, which, in the practical sense, means generalized assent
on the part of most if not all citizens.” 32 Following the collapse of the Soviet Union,
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the new Russian Federation overhauled its criminal code, implementing a new
system that was supposed to entitle defendants to professional representation,
prohibit torture, ensure the independence of the judiciary, limit unnecessary or
unlawful detentions, and ensure a speedy, fair trial. 33 However, actual practice has
deviated from the ideals envisioned by these reform efforts, and led many to
question the legitimacy of the whole system. In the words of Mark Feigin, one of the
defense lawyers for anti-Putin protesters Pussy Riot, “it’s very simple—there is no
justice in Russia. The decisions taken by courts bear no relation to what is actually
written down in the laws of the land.” 34
b. Timely Justice
Criminal justice reform in post-Soviet Russia included several provisions
devised to ensure timely execution of justice. However, lengthy pretrial detentions
and prosecutorial delays remain a widespread problem in Russia. 35 Some delays are
pernicious, while others are simply products of large case backlogs, lack of
discipline, and in some cases negligence or incompetence. 36
While the Russian Constitution now prohibits detention for over forty-eight
hours “except where authorized by judicial decision,” arbitrary, excessive, and
illegal detention is still widely practiced in Russia today. 37 Furthermore, the
Russian Criminal Procedure Code “sets a two-month time limit on the period
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between the opening of the investigation and the time that a file is transferred to
the [Prosecution] to initiate formal court charges.” 38 However, the Prosecution has
the discretion to extend this period up to eighteen months without any explanation
to detainees. 39 This is made worse by the fact that bail is very infrequently offered
in Russia, regardless of flight risk or type of crime. 40 Furthermore, it is not
uncommon for Prosecution to arbitrarily extend this period for the purpose of
extorting money from friends and family of detainees. 41
The Prosecution is also notorious for creating delays due to negligence and
incompetence in handling caseloads. For example, the Prosecution has a welldocumented tendency to delay submitting necessary paperwork to the court. 42 One
study found that the Prosecution only submitted paperwork within the statutory
time limits in one-third of cases. 43 The situation is so dire in some cases that some
suspects “spend as much time in pretrial detention as they would if found guilty of
the crime charged.” 44
c. Fair Trial
Another main focus of the post-Soviet reforms was implementing measures
aimed at ensuring a fair trial. This involved measures to increase the independence
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of the judiciary, limit arbitrary arrests, and afford suspects with competent legal
defense. However, this has not played out upon implementation.
Judicial independence and objectivity remains a serious problem in the
current regime. 45 Many judges still remain allegiant to the Party, and susceptible to
its influences, despite being technically granted lifetime appointment under the
new regime. 46 Many of Russia’s judges retained their positions from the Soviet
system and old habits die hard; and those who were newly appointed or simply do
not feel such lingering allegiances are still limited by “tight financial ties to the
political authorities.” 47 Additionally, judges in Russia still often serve the dual role
of judge and prosecutor, which limits their ability to serve as an objective arbiter of
justice. 48 Judges tend to take on this double duty when the Prosecution does not
appear, which occurs in approximately 60 percent of cases according to one study. 49
In such cases, the judge interrogates witnesses, presents evidence against the
defendant, and makes the final determination of guilt. 50
Under the new regime, the role of defense counsel is also quite limited. First,
legal defense, while technically guaranteed by law, is often too expensive or too
limited in supply to be available to defendants. 51 Second, the inquisitorial system in
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place in Russia limits the role of defense counsel in presenting cases. 52 Third, and
most strikingly, more than 99 percent of all criminal defendants in Russia are found
guilty. 53 This means that defense counsel’s role is limited to mitigating sentencing
decisions since conviction is almost a foregone conclusion upon arrest. 54
III. EXPLAINING THE PHENOMENON
“From a legal standpoint, Russia has achieved a democratic system dedicated
to protecting the rights of the individual. [However], [s]everal questions remain:
why does the Russian system fall so miserably in practice and how does an
ostensibly democratic society in the twenty-first century allow it to fail?” 55 This
section considers these questions and presents a few factors that contribute to the
failures in implementation, which plague the Russian criminal justice reform
efforts.
a. Persisting Politicization
Political concerns play a big part in legal decisions today in Russia in that
law enforcement and the judiciary seek to implement outcomes that satisfy the
whims of governing parties. According to an article in the Washington Post about
the Russian criminal justice system, “rules are words to dance around and laws
mean what the authorities say they mean.” 56 Accordingly, one factor, to which the
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phenomenon of bad implementation in the criminal justice system in Russia can
largely be attributed, is distorting political motivations and influences.
As point of illustration, take the extraordinary low acquittal rate. In Russia,
there is a popular belief that acquittals are a defect of the criminal justice system. 57
Too many of these “defects” makes the system appear flawed, and by proxy, makes
the government look weak and ineffective. 58 As a result of this belief, judges are
evaluated on the “stability of their sentences,” or in other words, on their acquittal
rates, and judges who grant too many acquittals risk being removed for poor
performance. 59
This highlights another problem. While post-Soviet reform efforts attempted
to increase the independence of the judiciary, the judiciary largely remains an agent
of the state, rather than the people. 60 Today, judges in Russia are “career officials
whose continuation in office and promotion depend upon the good will of the
chairmen of their courts.” 61 Judges, who grant too many acquittals, attempt creative
or innovative judicial interpretations, or insist on upholding laws to the detriment
of the Prosecution’s case, risk displeasing the chairman, and face the prospect of
being removed from their position. 62 This risk of removal seriously impedes the
objective implementation and execution of laws in Russia because judges have their
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own professional fates in mind when determining the legal fates of defendants in
their courtrooms.
More straight forward political influences also take the form of exemptions
and exceptions for friends and colleagues of the political elite. President Vladimir
Putin is well known for exempting government officials and wealthy businessmen
from prosecution. 63 Furthermore, Russian police often effectuate arrests
inconsistently depending on the person involved. 64
Ultimately, the State today, like in the Soviet era, remains very much
involved in the implementation of criminal justice in Russia. The result is a biased
and distorted process, which bends to the whims of the political elite and serves the
interests of the state and judiciary over the individual.
b. Attitude
Another potential explanation for, or contributing factor to the phenomenon
of bad implementation in the post-Soviet regime, could be the attitude with which
post-Soviet reforms have been, and are treated in Russia. The transition from the
Soviet code to the current criminal code involved a massive overhaul with
thousands of amendments, which took great effort and time to be passed into law. 65
While it is understandable that such massive transition takes time to fully
effectuate and perfect, judicial reform has moved slowly and many attempted
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reforms, such as jury trials, have been rolled back after unsuccessful trial runs. 66
This failure in implementation reflects the pervasive attitude in Russia that the
new laws are “ideals to aspire to” rather than mandatory standards. 67 This attitude
can be seen in many forms throughout the criminal justice system in Russia,
including the undisciplined implementation of pre-trial detainment time limits, the
continued removability of judges, and rampant arbitrary arrests, and likely
explains why Russia’s allegedly “great” new laws are so poorly implemented. 68
b. Bad Laws
Up until this point, this paper has accepted the premise that Russia’s new
criminal code is indeed comprised of great laws. However, it is worth considering
the possibility that the problems, which Russia’s criminal justice has faced since the
fall of the Soviet Union, might actually be the product of bad laws rather than bad
implementation. According to one account, “the Russian criminal code is so
oppressive and pervasive that ‘one must virtually retire to hermitage in order to
avoid committing a crime.” 69 Thus, perhaps the problem might be explained by an
overly large and complex set of laws that is simply impossible or difficult to
implement effectively and consistently. Another interpretation of this is that the
drawn out and controversial process that the new criminal code underwent in being
adopted, during which proposed changes were sacrificed, watered down, and
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compromised, produced an inconsistent and/or ambiguous set of laws that is at the
roots of Russia’s implementation problems. Perhaps too, the bad implementation is
simply coupled with bad laws, resulting in the troubled post-Soviet criminal justice
regime, which Russian legal practitioners have defensively tried to minimize with
the “good laws, bad implementation” phenomenon explored in this paper.
Regardless, it seems clear that further work is required to achieve a truly just,
democratic criminal justice system in Russia.
IV. CONCLUSION
There seems to be truth in the commentary provided by those I met during
my short visit to Russia. In fact, the simple formulation “great laws, bad
implementation” seems to be the perfect, succinct way to encapsulate the problems
posed by Russia’s massive criminal justice overhaul in the post-Soviet years. Many
of the reforms attempted to address the inadequacies and failings of the Soviet
system, however, the success of such reforms has been questionable. While it is not
fully clear what is at the root of this phenomenon of “bad implementation,” nor is it
even clear that Russia necessarily has “great laws,” it is clear that Russia’s criminal
justice transition is not yet complete. The Moscow based criminal defense attorney
might have seemed to gloss over the extent of the issues in explaining Russia’s
criminal justice system as a product of “great laws, but just bad implementation.”
However, perhaps the hope conveyed in his willingness to moderate is one way in
which Russia’s legal community continues to strive for a fair, just, and democratic
criminal justice system.

